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THE IMPACT OF EDWARD SNOWDEN’S
DISCLOSURES ON CANADA AND THE UNITED
KINGDOM’S SECURITY ESTABLISHMENTS
Daniel Alati1
The ‘world’s most wanted man,’ Edward Snowden,
might be one of the most polarizing figures in modern history.
This is particularly true in the United States, where the debates
pertaining to his leaks of classified information could not be
more divided. Many Americans, including senior level
government officials, have publicly argued that Snowden is a
cowardly traitor, and have forcefully stated their belief that
Snowden should return home to face a myriad of criminal
charges, including those under the 1917 Espionage Act.
However, many others have gone to great lengths and taken
immense personal risks to support Snowden and help further
his goal of bringing to light some of the most egregious
surveillance abuses ever released into the public sphere.
Dr. Daniel Alati is a post-doctoral researcher at the City University
of Hong Kong. His doctoral studies at the University of Oxford
focused on comparative anti-terrorism mechanisms in Canada and
the United Kingdom.
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Snowden’s closest confidants are still eager to tell his story:
Laura Poitras’ documentary ‘Citizenfour’ has received rave
reviews2 and long-time NSA critic and journalist James
Bamford recently interviewed Snowden in Moscow for
WIRED magazine.3
They continue to release leaked
documents that expose the greatest abuses of the global
surveillance machine Glenn Greenwald’s website, The
Intercept, reported recently that Canada’s leading surveillance
agency is analyzing records of up to fifteen million downloads
daily to track extremists.4 As a result, it seems likely that the
Snowden leaks, already considered by many to be the most
infamous example of whistleblowing of all time, will be a topic
of American and global conversation for years to come.
However, what is less clear is what kind of tangible
legislative change (if any) the Snowden leaks will bring about,
particularly in countries other than the U.S. While much has
been written about how the Snowden leaks have, and will
continue to, influence American domestic policy and
American diplomatic and intelligence-sharing arrangements
with other nations, less has been written about the impact that
the leaks have had on some of the U.S.’ most important allies.
This paper analyzes what impact the Snowden leaks have had
in Canada and the United Kingdom. Sections one and two
analyze the impact the Snowden disclosures have had on civil
society. In doing so, it notes a glaring lack of parliamentary
mechanisms for oversight of intelligence activities in Canada
and also illuminates issues with the existing mechanisms in
the UK. Section three examines what, if any, tangible
legislative outcomes have resulted from the Snowden leaks. It
concludes that it is difficult to assign any tangible legislative
Peter Bradshaw, Citizenfour Review – Gripping Snowden Documentary
Offers Portrait of Power, Paranoia, and One Remarkable Man, THE
GUARDIAN, Oct. 16, 2014,
http://www.theguardian.com/film/2014/oct/16/citizen-fourreview-edward-snowden-documentary.
3 James Bamford, Edward Snowden: The Untold Story, WIRED MAG.,
Aug. 22, 2014, http://www.wired.com/2014/08/edwardsnowden/.
4 Ryan Gallagher & Glenn Greenwald, Canada Casts Global
Surveillance Dragnet Over File Downloads, THE INTERCEPT, Jan. 28,
2015, https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/01/28/canada-cselevitation-mass-surveillance/.
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outcomes in either country to the leaks. Finally, in the
concluding section, recommendations for changes to the
oversight mechanisms in both countries that may help to
prevent the reoccurrence of some of the most egregious abuses
exposed by the Snowden leaks are posited.

I. CANADA – IMPACT OF SNOWDEN DISCLOSURES ON CIVIL
SOCIETY
Unsurprisingly, in the aftermath of the Snowden
disclosures there was a significant amount of material
published by Canadian academics, legal associations, judges,
standing committee members, Parliamentarians and the
media. This was to be expected as “Snowden’s revelations
have implicated Canada’s foreign intelligence signals agency –
the Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) – in
expansive domestic and foreign surveillance initiatives.”5
Some of these expansive and troubling initiatives, which
implicated both CSEC and other Canadian officials, include:
CSEC using airport Wi-Fi to track Canadian travelers;6 CSEC
setting up hidden spying posts in about twenty countries in
which it conducted espionage at the behest of the NSA;7
Canada allowing the NSA to spy on Canadian soil during the
2010 G8 and G20 Summits;8 Canadian embassies overseas

Simon Davies, A Crisis of Accountability: A Global Analysis of the
Impact of the Snowden Revelations, THE PRIVACY SURGEON 22 (2014),
https://citizenlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Snowdenfinal-report-for-publication.pdf.
6 Greg Weston, Glenn Greenwald & Ryan Gallagher, CSEC Used
Airport Wi-Fi to Track Canadian Travellers: Edward Snowden documents,
CBC NEWS, Jan. 30, 2014, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/csecused-airport-wi-fi-to-track-canadian-travellers-edward-snowdendocuments-1.2517881.
7 Greg Weston, Glenn Greenwald & Ryan Gallagher, Snowden
Document Shows Canada Set Up Posts for NSA, CBC NEWS, Dec. 9, 2013,
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/snowden-document-showscanada-set-up-spy-posts-for-nsa-1.2456886.
8 Greg Weston, Glenn Greenwald & Ryan Gallagher, New Snowden
Docs Show U.S. Spied During G20 in Toronto, CBC NEWS, Nov. 27,
2013, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/new-snowden-docs-showu-s-spied-during-g20-in-toronto-1.2442448.
5
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using eavesdropping technology;9 and, finally, allegations that
Canadian spies collected metadata of phone calls and e-mails
to and from Brazil’s Mines and Energy Ministry.10 While these
are only some examples of deeply worrisome Canadian
complicity in NSA activity, they underscore one of the most
significant areas of concern to be expressed by Canadian civil
society: the deep inter-connection between Canada and the
United States and the corresponding connection between their
intelligence activities. That Canada and the U.S. share deep
economic, geographic, and cultural ties is no secret, but the
extreme inter-connectedness of these two countries (and its
impact on their intelligence-sharing relationships) begs further
elucidation.
Farson and Teeple note that, “[t]he significance of the
long-standing economic relationship with the U.S. may be
even greater today for both parties, particularly given that
other traditional political and military allies are now economic
competitors. Certainly, it has become ever more integrated
with both countries remaining each other’s most significant
trading partner.”11 Moreover, Farson and Teeple point to
many other shared linkages between the countries that are
crucial to their intelligence sharing relationships, namely,
critical telecommunications and security infrastructure, and
argue that Canada has been seen as a “freeloader” because of
the imbalance between the two countries’ differing
contributions to North American defence and security.12
Canada, like the UK, is a member of the “Five Eyes”
community that

Colin Freeze, Canadian Embassies Eavesdrop, Leak Says, THE GLOBE &
MAIL, Oct. 29, 2013,
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/canada-involvedin-us-spying-efforts-abroad-leaked-documentsays/article15133508/.
10 Canadian Spies Targeted Brazil’s Mines Ministry: Report, CBC NEWS
(Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canadian-spies-targetedbrazil-s-mines-ministry-report-1.1927975.
11 Stuart Farson & Nancy Teeple, Increasing Canada’s Foreign
Intelligence Capability: Is it a Dead Issue?, INTELLIGENCE & NAT’L
SECURITY, Vol. 30, 47, 59 (2015).
12 Id. at 60.
9
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pools their resources, divide targets according
to geographic location and expertise, and share
analyses. In all cases, the NSA is the big
brother. In some instances, it helps fund the
activities of its partners in order to influence
intelligence gathering programs. . . . Canada’s
contribution focuses on the northern regions of
Russia and China, Latin America, as well the
northern parts of the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans.13

Academic commentators have criticized various
aspects of the intelligence sharing relationships between the
two counties. Clement has noted that,
[w]ell before the Snowden revelations, CIRA
commissioned an expert study of the Canadian
Internet infrastructure, which compared all
Canadian routings with those that transited the
United
States
and
found
significant
inefficiencies with the boomerang routing.
CIRA’s report concluded that Canadian
Internet access is heavily and unnecessarily
dependent
upon
foreign
infrastructure,
especially US infrastructure.14
He laments the fact that much of Canada’s internal Internet
traffic is routed through the US, noting that the lack of
international submarine fiber optic cables in Canada means
that “almost all of Canada’s third country Internet traffic is
similarly routed through the United States and via NSA
surveillance operations.”15 While some Canadian Internet
companies, such as Bell Canada, have seized upon this
opportunity to offer “safer, more private, domestic” Internet

Id. at 63.
Andrew Clement, Canada’s Bad Dream, WORLD POL’Y J., Vol. 31, 2533, 30 (2014), available at
http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/fall2014/canada's-baddream.
15 Id. at 27.
13
14
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solutions,16 the post-Snowden climate in Canada still
represents what Wesley Wark calls a “hopeful and distressing
reality.”17 According to Wark, it is
[h]opeful in the sense that we can anticipate a
kind of recalibration of US-led global
surveillance which might accord with our own
principles and interests; distressing in that it
reveals that Canada, enmeshed in its
dependency on the NSA, and suffering
problems of endemic secrecy, inadequate laws,
poor
accountability,
hands-off
political
leadership, and an ill-informed public, cannot
make independent headway in coming up with
our own, applied Snowden verdict on global
surveillance.18
Other than the issues noted above, there are several
obstacles to the effective development and operation of a
specifically Canadian system of intelligence oversight and
accountability. The first is cultural. As Jeffrey Roy notes,
[t]here is often a tendency in Canada to view
such activity with a certain detachment and
smugness: thank goodness that’s not us. Yet,
almost every significant scandal involving
government action in the US has been
accompanied by revelations in Canada that
public sector authorities are acting in a
remarkably similar manner.19
The second, more significant obstacle, is the lack of any
established parliamentary review mechanisms that provide for
Id. at 27-28.
Loch K. Johnson et. al, An INS Special Forum: Implications of the
Snowden Leaks, INTELLIGENCE & NAT’L SECURITY, Vol. 29, 793-810
(2014).
18 Id.
19 Jeffrey Roy, Secrecy, Security and Digital Literacy in an Era of MetaData: Why the Canadian Westminster Model Falls Short, INTELLIGENCE &
NAT’L SECURITY, 2-3 (2015).
16
17
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any kind of meaningful oversight or accountability. As will be
discussed further below, attempts to set up a National Security
Committee of Parliamentarians have been stymied for over a
decade, despite support for such a Committee stemming from
judicial inquiries, reports of parliamentary committees, civil
society organizations and the wider legal community. The
result is the “absence of such oversight altogether, which is
how one can reasonable characterize the Canadian model.
With the partial exception of Ministers directing them,
Canadian Parliamentarians are shielded from scrutinizing
security authorities in any direct and meaningful manner.”20
In order to more fully understand Canada’s current
lack of meaningful mechanisms for parliamentary review and
accountability of intelligence service activities, several stymied
attempts on behalf of Canadian civil society actors over the
course of the last decade must be noted. The first unsuccessful
attempt to create a novel Parliamentary Committee on
National Security (composed of both MPs and Senators from
across party lines) occurred in 2005 under a Liberal minority
government with the tabling of Bill C-81.21 Despite cross-party
support, that bill died on the order paper following the 2005
dissolution of the Canadian Parliament. The continuing lack
of effective parliamentary oversight was subsequently
criticized by two separate, independent judicial reviews
carried out by Justices O’Connor and Iacobucci pertaining to
the actions of Canadian officials in the war on terror (in
particular, CSIS and the RCMP).22 In particular, O’Connor
noted that the rendition experienced by Maher Arar urgently
emphasized that Canada was in need of an independent
national security review framework. A Standing Committee
on Public Safety and National Security tasked with reviewing
Iacobucci and O’Connor’s findings and recommendations
would later in 2009 find it “regrettable that the government
Id. at 7.
Full text, legislative history, and additional information pertaining
to the bill available at http://openparliament.ca/bills/38-1/C-81/.
22 Government of Canada Publications, Internal Inquiry into the
Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad
Abou-Elmaati and Muayyed Nureddin,
http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2010/bcppco/CP32-90-1-2010-eng.pdf.
20
21

COWARDLY TRAITOR OR HEROIC WHISTLEBLOWER?

98

has not yet established the independent national security
review framework recommended by Justice O’Connor” and
argue that said framework was “essential to prevent further
human rights violations.”23 They forcefully added that “there
was an urgent need for action” and that without an integrated
structure for the full review of national security issues,
Canadians would be at further risk of violations of their rights
and freedoms.24
To this date, no mechanism for parliamentary
oversight of intelligence or security mechanisms in Canada,
along the lines of that proposed in Bill C-81 or envisioned by
Justice O’Connor, exists.25 The ignorance of this alarming lack
of oversight seems to be a trend continuing through successive
Canadian governments that now continues under the current
Conservative government’s administration. For example, as
noted by Roy,
[a] report published by the federal Privacy
Commissioner in early 2014, in line with much
of the earlier analysis of the Canadian
apparatus, calls for fundamental political
reforms too ineffective or simply absent
mechanisms for overseeing the data gathering
activities of Canadian federal authorities as well
as the public and private sectors more widely.
Ottawa Standing Committee on Public Safety and National
Security, Review of the Findings and Recommendations Arising from the
Iacobucci and O’Connor Inquiries,
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId
=4004074.
24 Id. at 11-17. Recommendation five of this report states that, “[t]he
Committee recommends, once again, that Bill C-81, introduced in the
38th Parliament, An Act to Establish the National Security
Committee of Parliamentarians, or a variation of it, be introduced in
Parliament at the earliest opportunity.”
25 Two Bills (S-220, infra note 32, and C-551, infra note 33) have been
introduced in both the House and the Senate that continue the work
of Bill C-81, although neither bill has made any kind of significant
progress. For example, Bill C-551 was introduced into the House in
November of 2013 and has yet to progress, while Bill S-220 was
introduced into the Senate in May 2014 and has still yet to pass
Second Reading. Id.
23
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The report was widely applauded by Canadian
security experts, though largely ignored by the
Government itself.26

It is within this context of ignorance that the concerns of
Canadian civil society echo even louder. The Protect Our
Privacy Coalition, which is made up of more than fifty civil
society organisations, has launched an online initiative calling
on Members of Parliament to introduce restrictions that would
curtail CSEC’s most egregious abuses.27 Moreover, the British
Columbia Civil Liberties Association is constitutionally
challenging aspects of CSEC’s legal and operational
framework,28 and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association has
also launched a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of
PIPEDA, Canada’s federal data protection statute.29
Moreover, the Privacy Commissioner has released a statement
regarding telecommunications companies’ responses to
information requests from government authorities, in which a
number of recommendations are made, particularly in regards
to the transparency of authorized disclosures.30
In addition to these civil society actors, a number of
interested Members of Canadian Parliament have tried to
push for additional debate pertaining to CSEC’s activities and
Canada’s glaring lack of parliamentary overview of
Roy, supra note 19 at 17-18.
See OPEN MEDIA, https://openmedia.ca/ourprivacy (last visited
Oct. 23, 2015).
28 The litigation is ongoing. See Globe Editorial, Hey CSEC, Stop
Spying on Me, THE GLOBE & MAIL, Apr. 2, 2014,
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/editorials/dontspy-on-me-csec/article17781948.
29 The litigation is ongoing. See Alex Boutilier, Canadian Civil Liberties
Group Launches Court Challenge on Warrantless Access, THE TORONTO
STAR, May 21, 2014,
http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2014/05/21/canadian_civi
l_liberties_group_launches_court_challenge_on_warrantless_access.
html.
30 See Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Statement from
the Interim Privacy Commissioner of Canada Regarding
Telecommunications Companies’ Responses to Information Requests from
Government Authorities, https://www.priv.gc.ca/media/nrc/2014/s-d_140430_e.asp.
26
27
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intelligence activities. In calling for an emergency debate on
CSEC’s meta-data collection program, MP Charmaine Borg
argued that,
[a]n emergency debate is needed so that
parliamentarians can take an in-depth look at
the extent to which Canadians' personal
information, metadata and other information
are collected by the police, law enforcement
agencies and national security agencies. This
debate is also needed so that we can look at
measures that will lead to appropriate
parliamentary oversight and ways to balance
public and national security interests with
Canadians' privacy rights.31
Moreover, as aforementioned, interested members of
Parliament have introduced two bills (S-22032 and C-55133) in
order to further the work of C-81 and create a Parliamentary
Committee for the oversight of national security and
intelligence activities. The current Canadian government’s
response (or lack thereof) to the various efforts of academics
and other civil society actors outlined in this section will be
considered in this paper’s subsequent analysis of tangible
legislative outcomes to result from the Snowden disclosures.

II. UNITED KINGDOM – IMPACT OF SNOWDEN DISCLOSURES
ON CIVIL SOCIETY

Charmaine Borg on Request for Emergency Debate, June 13, 2013,
http://openparliament.ca/debates/2013/6/13/charmaine-borg1/only/.
32 An Act to Establish the Intelligence and Security Committee of
Parliament,
http://www.parl.gc.ca/legisinfo/BillDetails.aspx?billId=6556209&L
anguage=E&Mode=1
33 National Security Committee of Parliamentarians Act,
http://www.parl.gc.ca/legisinfo/BillDetails.aspx?billId=6256801&L
anguage=E&Mode=1.
31
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Whereas the Snowden disclosures in Canada and the
United States sparked widespread civil society debate and
condemnation, reaction to the disclosures in the United
Kingdom has been markedly different, particularly in regards
to the responses from the political classes. As Martin Moore
notes,
[t]he reaction in the UK has to date been
startlingly different. The political class jointly
defended the actions of the security services,
and most shied away from proposing reform of
the law. The press was split on their response,
some recommending prosecution of the
messenger, The Guardian. . . . It is difficult to
explain why the reaction in the two countries
has been so different. No doubt partly it is
cultural, and partly due to contrasting public
attitudes in the UK and US to the role of the
state. It must also be due in part to the UK’s
intelligence services’ importance to its
international status. Intelligence remains one
area where the UK is considered, in terms of
expertise and performance, to be on a par with
global superpowers.34
As was the case with CSEC in Canada, the material disclosed
by Snowden implicated the UK’s counterpart GCHQ
(Government Communications Head Quarters) in various
spying activities. Mark Young notes that, “British government
concerns about the potential publication of classified data
were significant enough to threaten The Guardian with legal
action if the information was not destroyed. The threats
prompted the destruction of hard drives containing
information related to GCHQ.”35

Martin Moore, RIP RIPA? Snowden, Surveillance, and the
Inadequacies of our Existing Legal Framework, THE POL. Q., Vol. 85, No.
2, 125-132, 125-126 (2014).
35 Mark Young, National Insecurity: The Impacts of Illegal Disclosures of
Classified Information, I/S: A J. OF LAW & POL’Y FOR THE INFO. SOC’Y,
Vol. 10, 367, 368 (2014).
34
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The United Kingdom has been placed in a particularly
precarious position by the Snowden disclosures because of its
relationship with the European Union. As was the case with
Canada and the United States, the United Kingdom and the
European Union share a vast inter-connectedness in several
fields, including intelligence sharing and gathering. For
instance, Bauman notes that, “[t]he UK has been in an
especially delicate position given that GCHQ has participated
in aggressive behavior against other partners and EU
institutions while being part of the European Union and
having signed the EU treaty which requires member states’
loyalty.”36 Again, similar to what was the case in Canada and
the United States, much of Europe’s Internet traffic is routed
through the United Kingdom. As Brown and Korff note, the
UK
is the landing point for the majority of
transatlantic fibre-optic cables. GCHQ has
reportedly placed data interceptors on fibreoptic cables conveying internet data in and out
of the UK, and are able to store a significant
fraction of global Internet traffic for three days
on a rolling basis while carrying out further
automated analysis.37
Despite Canada’s connections to the United States, and the
UK’s connection to Europe, it is clear that the NSA and the
GCHQ have invested more resources in their activities than
any other organisations on earth. As Bauman notes,
[t]he NSA has a budget of US $10.8 bn (7.8 bn
Euros) a year, whereas within Europe GCHQ’s
budget of 1.2 bn Euros is well below the NSA,
but nevertheless over twice the yearly budget of
other agencies such as BND, FRA, or DGSE.
This is why it may be more accurate to speak of
Zygmunet Bauman et. al, After Snowden: Rethinking the Impact of
Surveillance, INT’L POL. SOC., Vol. 8, 121-144, 127 (2014).
37 Ian Brown & Douwe Korff, Foreign Surveillance: Law and Practice in
a Global Digital Environment, EUROPEAN HUM. RTS L. REV., Vol. 3, 243251, 243 (2014).
36
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an Anglo-American guild of professionals
extended to other Western intelligence services
than to analyze the network as a US-European
collaboration on an equal footing, or even a
transatlantic collaboration correlated with
NATO.38

Unlike Canada, the United Kingdom does have various
mechanisms for oversight of national security and intelligence
activities, which has led to a variety of pre and post-Snowden
analyses and recommendations for change. As Sudha Setty
notes,
[n]umerous parliamentary committees have
undertaken investigations of the surveillance
apparatus in the United Kingdom. A broad
investigation by the Constitution Committee
led to findings in 2009 that the intelligencegathering services were largely compliant with
the law, but that report included numerous
recommendations for changes to surveillance
authority and transparency, including giving
greater consideration to civil liberties before
implementing further surveillance programs,
granting
greater
authority
to
various
commissioners to exercise increased oversight,
revisiting existing legislation to increase
specificity in the surveillance authority, and
making the work of the Investigatory Powers
Tribunal more transparent.39
Writing in Martin Moore’s piece, Jenna Stratford, QC agrees
that there are flaws with the Investigatory Powers Tribunal,
namely that “[w]here complaints are rejected, as the huge
majority unsurprisingly are, claimants are not given proper
reasons but instead the judicial equivalent of a ‘neither
confirm nor deny’ notice. In addition, at present there is no
possibility of appeal from the Tribunal’s decisions, so that
Bauman, supra note 36.
Sudha Setty, Surveillance, Secrecy, and the Search for Meaningful
Accountability, 51 STAN. J. INT'L L. 69 (2015).
38
39

COWARDLY TRAITOR OR HEROIC WHISTLEBLOWER?

104

probably the only recourse is to Strasbourg.”40 Furthermore,
the Intelligence and Security Committee considered whether
GCHQ’s receipt of information by the NSA from the PRISM
program was legal, ultimately finding that the GCHQ’s
actions were compliant with the statutory framework, but
concluding that the framework required additional
specificity.41
A further complication arises in the United Kingdom
because of the operation of the Regulation of Investigatory
Powers Act (RIPA).42 As Setty notes, under the operation of
this act,
[t]he sole recourse for challenging such actions
under U.K. law is making a claim to the
Investigatory Powers Tribunal and that,
although the Human Rights Act 1998
incorporates the European Convention on
Human Rights (“ECHR”) into U.K. domestic
law, if the judiciary believes that a national
security measure is incompatible with the
ECHR standard, it may declare incompatibility
but this does not constitute a mandate that the
domestic security apparatus change its policies.
As such, review at the domestic level has often
been sharply curtailed.43
RIPA has been criticized by many as an outdated piece of
legislation that does not fit the current realities of our
technologically advanced world. Lord Ken Macdonald QC,
who was the Director of Public Prosecutions in England and
Wales from 2003-2008, argues that RIPA “was not written in
the age of social media and big data. It is inherently
Moore, supra note 34.
Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Statement on
GCHQ’s Alleged Interception of Communications under the US PRISM
Programme, July 17, 2013,
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attac
hment_data/file/225459/ISC-Statement-on-GCHQ.pdf.
42 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000,
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/contents.
43 Setty, supra note 39.
40
41
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backwardlooking” and Jenna Straford echoes this sentiment
by stating that, “RIPA contains only limited restrictions on the
transfer of data to third-party powers. The Secretary of State
has extremely wide discretion—almost unfettered in
practice—to determine whether data may be transferred.”44
Despite the aforementioned varying responses by the
media and political classes following the Snowden revelations,
members of UK civil society have taken issue with the political
responses of the UK Government in the post-Snowden era. In
the Institute for Public Policy Research’s Study Democracy in
Britain, Lord Macdonald argues that revelations about the
GCHQ’s Project Tempora
point, perhaps, to an excessive and therefore
damaging devotion to secrecy that appears to
trump the right, even of parliament, to have a
basic say in our security arrangements. The
apparent manner of its conception and the
government’s response to its being revealed is
each troubling for the light it casts on questions
of oversight and democratic accountability.45
For Lord Macdonald, one of the most troubling aspects of
what the Snowden disclosures revealed was that the GCHQ
developed these capabilities while Government arguments to
enact them in legislation were being successfully defeated in
Parliament. As he notes, “[w]e are witnessing the creation of a
very broad surveillance scheme by the backdoor – as
successive governments have failed to persuade parliament
that such schemes are justified or desirable – and a
simultaneous growth in capacity and ambition on the part of
GCHQ in the complete absence of debate, still less
legislation.”46 Lord Macdonald refers to recent government
attempts to suggest that Tempora is implicitly authorized by
RIPA as “deeply unconvincing,” questioning how it was
possible that, “[i]f Chris Huhne is to be believed, the cabinet
Moore, supra note 34.
Guy Lodge & Glenn Gottfried (eds.), Democracy in Britain: Essays in
Honour of James Cornford, INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y RES. (LONDON: UNITED
KINGDOM) 173 (2014).
46 Id. at 174.
44
45
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and national security council did know [about Tempora].
They were never told.”47
Similarly, the House of Commons Home Affairs
Committee released a seething report pertaining to the current
UK mechanisms for intelligence oversight,48 in which it
criticized members of the British civil service – particularly the
National Security Adviser and the head of MI5 – for refusing
to give evidence.49 While the Committee did acknowledge
that the Justice and Security Act50 made some changes to the
Intelligence and Security Committee, it still concluded that,
[w]e do not believe the current system of
oversight is effective and we have concerns that
the weak nature of that system has an impact
upon the credibility of the agencies
accountability, and to the credibility of
Parliament itself. Whilst we recognize the
importance of limiting the access to documents
of a confidential nature . . . engagement with
elected representatives is not, in itself, a danger
to national security and to continue to insist so
is hyperbole.51
It also levied several criticisms towards the Investigatory
Powers Tribunal and RIPA,52 and called it “unacceptable” that
there was so much confusion around the work of the
Intelligence Services Commissioner.53 In doing so, they made
a number of recommendations that will be considered further
in this paper’s subsequent (and concluding) section on
recommendations for change.
Id. at 175.
HOUSE OF COMMONS HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, COUNTERTERRORISM: SEVENTEENTH REPORT OF SESSION 2013-14, 66 [hereinafter
Home Affairs Committee 17th Report], available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/c
mhaff/231/231.pdf.
49 Id.
50 Justice and Security Act 2013 c. 18, available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/18/contents/enacted.
51 Home Affairs Committee 17th Report, supra note 48.
52 Id. at 63-4, 70-71.
53 Id. at 66.
47
48
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III. CANADA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM – THE IMPACT OF
THE SNOWDEN DISCLOSURES ON TANGIBLE LEGISLATIVE
OUTCOMES
Andrew Clement has argued that, “[h]ow Canada
responds to the NSA-Snowden crisis will define its identity
and shape its future for decades to come.”54 Unfortunately, if
the early returns are a sign of things to come, Canada is not on
its way to responding to the Snowden disclosures in any kind
of comprehensive or definitive manner. Granted, in the first
section of this paper, several attempts were made by members
of Canadian civil society to point to a glaring lack of
parliamentary oversight of intelligence activities. As noted in
A Crisis of Accountability, a joint publication published in
association with the University of Amsterdam’s Institute for
Information Law and the Vrije Universiteit of Brussels,
“[w]hile the net result has led to a greater understanding of
CSEC’s activities and objectives, there has been minimal
concrete movement towards reform aside from some early
judicial proceedings.”55 It is still unknown at this point
whether either of the aforementioned constitutional challenges
launched by the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association
or the Canadian Civil Liberties Association will lead to fruitful
reform. Despite a very active civil society, responses from the
current Conservative government have been sparse.
Hopes for future tangible legislative outcomes are
further called into question by the past track record of
successive Canadian governments. For over a decade now,
various iterations of Bill C-81 (which would enact a National
Security Committee of Parliamentarians to provide some form
of parliamentary scrutiny of intelligence activities) have died
in successive Canadian parliaments, despite cross-party
support in 2005 at the time of the bill’s inception. At that time,
political instability associated with successive minority
governments (and the corresponding dissolution of
Parliament) could easily be assigned blame for the demise of
Bill C-81. However, as Roy Notes, “[i]f partisan collaboration
is rare and tenuous during minority regimes, it is quickly
54
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forgotten once majority status is returned since the victors see
little compelling reasoning in sharing unfettered power with
its now-defeated opponents.”56 The aforementioned current
iterations of the bills (Bills S-220 and C-551) have been moving
through Parliament at a snail’s pace, despite the impetus placed
on them by the Snowden revelations. Even before the
Snowden revelations, two separate judicial inquiries by
Justices Iacobucci and O’Connor (both of which attracted
significant public attention) called attention to an alarming
lack of parliamentary oversight of intelligence activities in
Canada. To date, the recommendations of these inquiries have
still not been taken up by the Canadian government, despite
the fact that the Standing Committee on Public Safety and
National Security has reiterated their importance. While
Canadians often enjoy debating the potential shortcomings of
the US Congressional model, “other likeminded democracies
have or are also forging more robust oversight and review
mechanisms that are likely to prove increasingly consequential
in balancing competing interests of security, secrecy and
privacy in an environment of digital connectedness and
information abundance.”57 Canada can ill-afford to stay
stagnant in a world that continues to evolve and produce new
digital realities. Nor can it afford to hope that its civil society
or its courts will spur the Canadian government to action.
To contrast, the issue in the UK is certainly not a lack of
parliamentary oversight mechanisms of intelligence activities,
but rather the appropriate means through which existing
legislation and mechanisms should be refined. For the most
part, the UK Government has responded with silence and
secrecy, even going so far as to attack The Guardian and force
them to destroy material that would be damaging to the
GCHQ. It has been noted that, “Deputy Prime Minister Nick
Clegg has ordered an ’Obama-style’ review of intelligence
agencies, to be led by the Royal United Services Institute, but
the report will not even be released until after the May 2015
elections.”58 As a result of this government response, Brown
and Korff have argued that, “[i]t seems judicial intervention
will be required to bring the UK’s legal framework back into
Roy, supra note 19 at 8.
Id. at 22.
58 Davies, supra note 5, 70.
56
57
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compliance with the Human Rights Convention.”59 As noted
above by Setty, even successful litigation may not bring about
effective change because of the UK’s complex arrangements
under RIPA, the European Convention for Human Rights and
the Human Rights Act. As a result, “[w]ithout a Snowden-like
disclosure to enable such review, or a strong commitment by
the United Kingdom to abide by the human rights standards
articulated at the European level, parliamentary oversight
would be the key mechanism to protect against overreaching
by the British intelligence community.”60
If parliamentary oversight is to be the key mechanism
to protect against future overreaching of the British
intelligence community, then the recommendations put
forward by UK civil society members, in particular Lord
Macdonald and the House of Commons Home Affairs
Committee, need to be taken seriously. While some may
argue that the 2013 Justice and Security Act attempted to do
just that,61 others are more skeptical. As Lord Macdonald
notes,
[t]he Justice and Security Act passed last year
handed marginally more power to the ISC, but
did little to correct executive control over it.
For example, each committee member is now
appointed by parliament but must first be
nominated for membership by the prime
minister. The ISC now has the power to call for
evidence or information from ministers and
agencies; however, the means and manner in
which information can be provided to the ISC
must be outlined through a memorandum of
understanding with the prime minister. In the
Brown & Korff, supra note 37 at 6.
Setty, supra note 39 at 28.
61 Home Affairs Committee 17th Report, supra note 48 at 62. “A
number of witnesses to this inquiry took the opportunity to highlight
the improvements to the Intelligence and Security Committee which
were contained within the Justice and Security Act 2013. There were
suggestions that the committee ought not to be judged on its
previous failures but rather time ought to be given to see how it
worked under the new regime.” Id.
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light of the Snowden revelations, it seems that
reforms in the J&S Act did not go far enough.
Moreover, we also need to consider the extent
to which RIPA can be said to remain an
adequate
mechanism
for
regulating
surveillance activities.62
Even if one accepts the argument that the Justice and Security
Act was an attempt to respond to deficiencies in the oversight
of intelligence activities, this paper has noted the concerns of
several academics and civil society actors pertaining to various
other pieces of legislation and mechanisms, including RIPA
and the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, that have not been
consequentially amended by that Act. These still require
further attention on the part of the UK Government before any
true tangible legislative outcome can be assessed to the
Snowden disclosures.

IV. CONCLUSION – RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE
CHANGE
Despite the apparent conclusion that neither the
Canadian nor the UK government has responded to the
Edward Snowden disclosures with tangible, consequential
legislative changes, it cannot be said that these disclosures
have had no impact. The revelations provided for by the
Snowden documents have fundamentally changed public
perceptions in both countries about how intelligence activities
are carried out and have sparked civil society commentary
amongst academics, judges, legal practitioners, interest groups
and the media pertaining to how oversight of intelligence
communities should be improved in the future. The immense
energy and analysis that has gone into these various
commentaries should not be lost. As Wesley Wark argues,
[w]hatever badge we stick to Mr. Snowden
(and his media collaborators) may in itself not
matter very much, and certainly will be
dwarfed by the issue that he has called our
62
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attention to. That issue is the practice, and
future, of global electronic surveillance by state
intelligence agencies. The ultimate verdict(s)
regarding Edward Snowden the man will pale
in significance alongside the verdict(s) on
global surveillance.63

With that in mind, this paper will now conclude by reiterating
some of the most important changes that urgently need to be
considered by both Canada and the UK going forward into a
post-Snowden future.
For Canada, the most urgently needed change required
is clear: the work of Bill C-81 needs to be fast-tracked through
its current iterations, either Bill S-220 or C-551, so that the
country may finally have some form of parliamentary review
and oversight of intelligence activities.
The Canadian
government should not need to be implored to do this through
damaging revelations of sensitive material, which will
undoubtedly continue in the future (as noted at the outset of
this paper, a new Intercept story pertaining to CSEC’s spying
was released only recently). Various successive Canadian
governments have for too long ignored a glaring deficiency in
Canada’s overall national security apparatus. Two separate
judicial inquiries have been commissioned (at no small
expense to the Canadian taxpayer) and both have
recommended the immediate need for additional review
mechanisms. These recommendations have been further
bolstered by the Standing Committee on Public Safety and
National Security, and have been demanded by various civil
society actors noted in this paper. The Canadian government
is poised to introduce a whole new set of anti-terrorism laws
that it has been working on since last year’s attack on
Parliament Hill.64 There is growing concern that this new
package of laws will actually increase powers of various
Loch K. Johnson et. al, An INS Special Forum: Implications of the
Snowden Leaks, INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY, Vol. 29, 793810, 810 (2014).
64 Jim Bronskill, Five Things to Know About Canada’s New Antiterrorism Measures, CTV NEWS, Jan. 30, 2015,
http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/five-things-to-know-aboutcanada-s-new-anti-terrorism-measures-1.2213071.
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intelligence and police agencies.65 These concerns are further
exacerbated by the fact that Canada has no genuine
accountability mechanisms for the oversight of these agencies,
or for its national security apparatus as a whole. It is simply
irresponsible for the Canadian government to go forward with
new counter-terrorism legislation without addressing this
glaring gap in its current national security framework.
In contrast to Canada, the United Kingdom is
significantly ahead in regards to existing infrastructure for
parliamentary oversight and accountability of intelligence
activities. That being said, there are a number of targeted
recommendations for change that could significantly improve
these oversight mechanisms, were they to be acted upon by
the UK government. In particular, Lord Macdonald suggests
six additional reforms: 1) The ISC should become a full joint
parliamentary select committee; 2) it should be appointed by
and responsible to both Houses of Parliament; 3) it should
have stronger powers to obtain evidence. These should
include the power to obtain information, by summons, from
outside parties, lay experts, ministers and civil servants, as
well as from security chiefs; 4) it should have an independent
secretariat and independent legal advice, and it should have
access to all information. Select committee procedures already
allow the exclusion of material whose publication might be
harmful and the disclosure of such material is a serious
criminal offence; 5) it’s chair should be a member of the
opposition and should not be someone who has previously
held responsibility for any of the security agencies; 6) Finally,
we need to increase the level of institutional expertise to
ensure that human rights are put at the heart of policy and
strategies in this area, at a level that is more than rhetorical.
We need to consider how such a committee could develop a
wider role in educating parliament as a whole and,
consequently, the public.66
Similarly, the House of Commons Home Affairs
Committee makes a number of recommendations that echo
those of Lord Macdonald. They also believed that there were
Andrea Janus, Spy Service to Get Stronger Under Federal Bill, CTV
NEWS, Jan. 30, 2015, http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/spy-serviceto-get-stronger-under-federal-bill-1.2213119.
66 Lodge & Gottfried, supra note 45 at 178-179.
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several ways in which the ISC could be strengthened: 1)
election of the membership of the Committee by the House of
Commons; 2) the Chair of the Committee being a member of
the Opposition and not a former Minister with responsibility
for any of the agencies; 3) ensuring that the Committee has
access to relevant expertise (for instance in terms of the
technological aspect of the work carried out by the security
and intelligence agencies); 4) allowing other Parliamentary
Committees to scrutinize the work of the security and
intelligence agencies.67 The Committee also recommended
that the Investigatory Powers Tribunal be legislatively
compelled to produce an annual report on their work,
containing at the very least the number of cases it has received
and the outcome of cases determined in that year.68 Finally, in
regards to RIPA, the Committee argued that,
[g]iven the criticism which the Regulation of
the Investigatory Powers Act is subject to, we
believe that the legislation is in need of review.
We recommend that a Joint Committee of both
Houses of Parliament should be appointed in
order to hold an inquiry with the ability to take
evidence on the Act with a view to updating it.
This inquiry would aim to bring the Regulation
of Investigatory Powers Act up to date with
modern technology, reduce the complexity (and
associated difficulty in the use of) the
legislation, strengthen the statistical and
transparency requirements and improve the
oversight functions as are set out in the current
Act.69
Although both Canada and the UK have very different
starting points for how they should oversee their intelligence
activities in the future, the motive behind both is the same.
Civil society confidence in the ability of both governments to
protect the privacy of their citizens reached an all-time low
following the Snowden disclosures. As is noted by Bauman,
Home Affairs Committee 17th Report, supra note 48 at 62.
Id. at 63-64.
69 Id. at 70-71.
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[o]nly 5% of respondents in Canada trust
government to guard their data, and this only
rises to 7% in the United States. Whether in the
United States, Canada, or the UK, it is clear
from these results that a substantial proportion
of the population are concerned about
government surveillance and that there is a
high degree of cynicism about what
governments do with those data.70
Members of civil society in both countries are doing what they
can to compel their governments to act, but there is only so
much they can do if their governments are unwilling. Both
Canada and the UK need to start treating the Snowden
disclosures as an opportunity to reassess how they collect
intelligence, when they collect intelligence, who they share
intelligence with and, perhaps most importantly, how they
oversee the collection of that intelligence.
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